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I. BACKGROUND 
The importance of and need for co-operation with the governments of the develop-
ing countries in -their relations with transnational corporations has been fully 
recognized in international forums, and was thè reason for thé creation of'the 
United Nations Centre on Transnational Corporations in November 1975. Among the 
functions of the Centre, one of its basic and permanent responsibilities.will be 
to expand the negotiating capacity of the host countries with transnational cor-
porations, on the basis of research activities, the development of an information 
system and the provision of technical co-operation to thè countries. 
One of the aspects which has raised the greatest interest among the develop-
ing countries has been the possibility of training government officials in areas 
relating to the presence and operation of transnational.corporations in those 
countries. 
In this spirit, the Economic Commission for Latin America (ECLA) and the 
United Nations Centre on Transnational Corporations (CTC) have agreed to hold à 
seminar for appraising the influence of transnational corporations on Central 
American deVélopmènt. 
II. OBJECTIVES -
The main purpose of the seminar was to increase the understanding of government 
officials in charge of formulating and implementing policies connected with the 
participation of foreign capital in the economy of the countries of the region, 
especially with transnational corporations, concerning a wide range of topics 
relating to the presence and activities of those corporations iii the region. It 
was sought in this way to help strengthen the negotiating capacity of the countries 
with transnational corporations. 
' ' III. PARTICIPATION 
High officials from the following countries-participated iix.the seminar; Costa Rica, 
El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras and Panama. The seminar was also attended by 
observers from the following institutions: thè Costa Rican Development Corporation 
(CODESA), the Latin American Institute for the Prevention of Crime and Treatment 
of Delinquents (ÏLANUD), thè Central American Institute Of Public Administration 
(ICAP) and the Office of the Controller-General of the Republic of Nicaragua.*/ 
See list of participants in annex 1. 
/IV. CONTENT 
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IV. CONTENT OF.THE SEMINAR 
The seminar took place over 12 working sessions, six of which had the purpose of 
harmonizing the participants' knowledge of the. current problems of the .región, 
botih economic and social, ̂ and of the presence and.impact of transnational corpo-
rations, in Latin America. A closing ceremony held on 27 October concluded the 
seminar.*/. . 
The participants had before them .working documents prepared by experts, and 
consultants from the QTC and EjCLA,£V. 
The summary of the meetings appears below. 
i. Problems .Central American development /" 
The discussion was led by Mr. Gert Rosenthal, Director of the ECLA Mexido Office, 
who reviewed and analysed the long-term development trends, pf the subregion, 
current, problems and some future prpspects. : .Vt , . , 
ïn approaching the first topic, six contradictions raised by Cbntral Ambrican 
development were explored. 
a) Inequitable economic development. The subregion as a whole had experienced 
high growth and considerable quantitative and qualitative alterations in the macro 
and micro-economic spheres, but the results of that growth had been distributed in 
a very .unequal and exclusive way anpng the different population strata, accen-
tuating. ¡income concentration. \'' 
b) Grqwth and diversification * of'.exports with continued vulnerability of the, 
external sector; Although the gross domestic product generated by the export .' ' 
sector rose from 2.0% in 1950 to 35% in 1980, the economies were depending to a 
greater extent today than before oh the flow of funds into the capital account. 
The export sector was very dynamic, but was continuing to be extremely vulnerable 
to external fluctuations, more vulnerable than the average of the Latin American 
countries; it should be kept in mind that two-thirds of the employment opportunities 
in Central America depend on that sector.***/ 
c) Stimulations and restrictions of economic integration in Central America» 
The Conmon Market provided a powerful stimulus to the economic development of the 
region, but the process was not. carried further and did not succeed in raising 
its level, and therefore, once the Common Market, was consolidated in about the 
mid-1960s efforts to ..submit new activities to joint "treatment, did not have signi-
ficant results. 
*/ See programme of the seminar in annex 2. 
See list of documents in annex 3. 




d) Co-existence of I rudimentary subsistence agriculture, and a modern export 
agriculture. The modern export agriculture naturally cornered the best resources, 
and there was no transmission effect from the more modern to the more antiquated 
type, which utilized marginal property to develop its activity. That would explain 
the unequal inoome structure in that sector. 
e) Growing diversification and stratification of societies. This process had 
introduced an increasing complexity into society, with political and social 
repercussions, iri spite of which societies were continuing to be closed and not 
highly participatory. 
f) Lack of communication between the public and private sectors with regard to 
the role incumbent on each in the promotion of economic development. The year 
1970 began to see changes when disturbances were produced in the functioning of 
the world economy and the framework of the Bretton Woods agreements, which had 
repercussions on Central America because the economy of that region was open, and 
in addition the region suffered the consequences of its high dependence on oil 
imports. ' 
In addition, the high economic interdependence of those economies facili-
tated the spreading of the crisis, and social and political tensions appeared in 
all o f the countries of the subregion, which.were r e f l e c t ed in a drop in investment 
and in a drain of capital. 
In order to appreciate the. deterioration of the economic situation, it is 
sufficient to consider the fact that, for the first tin® in the history of the 
five countries, their growth rates were negative, and that per capita income fell 
to its 1960 level. 
With regard to current problems, it should be pointed out that the fall in 
exports together with higher import prices had aggravated the trend towards 
balance-of-payments deficits. Furthermore, the repercussions of the decisions 
adopted ill the area of finance in the developed countries from 1980 on, as a 
result of which the interest rate rose, had caused the depletion of monetary 
reserves. Thus external phenomena with negative repercussions aggravated the 
situation in the subregicn. 
In addition, the integration process, which until then had attenuated the 
effects of the world crisis, had helped reduce trade for the first time when the 
scarcity of foreign currency for settling transactions began to make itself felt. 
The situation was dealt with differently by the different Governments, and some 
of them begin to apply very orthodox adjustment policies» at times influenced by 
the International Monetary Fundi 
At this point in time, one might well ask whether that tendency should not 
be reversed arid that action should not be conditioned upon what occurred in the 
international economy. Another unknown factor of current concern to the region 
was the type of society which would be formed in the future. 
/In conclusion. 
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. In conclusion, it should be borne in mind that the region was capable of 
supplying its o ^ yipp.d, that the; potential offerêd by •&tra-Céntral "American 
co-operation couid be utilized and that, the region should not fail to take 
advantage of existing installed capacity. 
The statement raised an extensive debate during which several questions were 
asked by the participants,-. Interest was expressed in how the problem of scarcity 
of foreign currency,; could solved when markets and financing sources were closed» 
He replied that there was great concern over, the current situation of scarcity 
of foreign currency, and that to resolve it the problem should be approached from 
two points of view: the very short term and the medium term. From the short-term 
point of yiewj, .priority shpuld be, given to the production of fopd and goods;of lew 
import-" confianti"' tàiçfr wuld .both; "errsufre 'food : supply'; and abëor1b~:Memplbymeht, That 
objective would be attained by implementing a programme of 'public; investment, 
although that could run contrary to those who claimed that "efficiency" should be. 
aimed at above all else. With regard to the medium term, although a form- of 
dynamic insertion into the world economy must be found, a contradiction was raised 
in that at present the world economy was not dynamic and in addition, there was 
the current obstacle of protectionism. 
In the medium term, criteria for restructuring the potential for .regional. . , 
co-operation should be examined, since Central America still had.a vocation to 
work jointly to solve common problems, which made it possible to maintain a trade 
régime and take collective steps with respect to the international community. 
With regard to a concern raised by one participant relating to the adoption 
of orthodox;measures for adjusting to the new situation» in compliance with the 
recommendations of the International Monetary Fund, he said that.less restrictive 
solutions should be sought and that ECLA should help the Governments find more 
imaginative formulas. 
Taking account of the drop, in the dollar, there was great interest in. 
whether Central America should continue•tying its monetary parity to that currency. 
He said that it should be borne in mind that Central America had applied an . . 
orthodox monetary policy and that, although some countries had devalued their 
currency, trade had been maintained. With regard to maintaining .fixed, parity with 
the dollar, account should be taken of the consequences to the economy of a 
subvalued currency and the problems which would be raisa4 by the monetary 
integration of countries applying very different exchange.policies. 
Several participants felt that the process of industrialization of Central 
America had been carried out in a disorganized ̂ ay, since it was. thought that, any 
industry was advantageous and in addition an industrialization with a high import 
component had been stimulated and capital investments made which had had the 
effect of economizing manpower.. He said that in the future, that industrialization 
model should be altered so as to stipala.te.,Jthe açstiv̂  processing of national ra.w 
materials, make use of comparative advantages, and that the production of luxury 
consumer articles should be 4.isco;ur£tgedr 
/In reply 
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In reply to another participant, who wished to know the possible repercussions 
of the trend in vogue of supporting private'instead of public investments,he said 
that that trend caused some coficern, since i t appeared to be a measure which respon-
ded to a conceptual framework that was. more v a l i d f o r the United States than for 
Central America. When the actual situation of Central America was considered, it 
appeared more advantageous to stimulate the public sector. He believed that a new 
era was approaching, in which import substitution activities should be given further 
stimulation. 
Several participants referred to the repercussions of the currency devaluation. 
One such repercussion was that it brought down the price of local commissions for 
those who had dollars, with the consequent effects on foreign transnational 
investment. In addition, the lack of private entrepreneurs meant that if the public 
enterprise did not carry out Some activity the vatUum would be filled by the 
transnational. He said he felt that the currency was being devalued in order to 
provide an export orientation, but the experience was too recent to know what the 
results of that measure would be. It should be borne in mind that the investor 
compared the advantages of the devaluation with the risks, and he did not believe 
that that measure had brought about investments. The State sector could not 
withdraw and should continue participating in production. 
2. Internationalization of the world economy and 
the transnational corporations 
The discussion was led by Mr. Aníbal Pinto, ECLA Consultant, who referred to'the 
need for situating the review of the transnational corporations in the historical 
context of the phenomenon of internationalization. The transnational corporations 
constituted one of the ways in which the process of internationalization of the 
world economy was carried out. In the internationalization of the world economy, 
which was no more than a process of international division of work, a double process 
was developed": division and fragmentation on the one hand and concentration on the 
other; that occurred in different historical scenarios and with different 
consequences. 
There had been several internationalization cycles: 
a) The first was the colonial period, which had been of long duration and of 
an intensive and extensive nature. It had been characterized by a monopoly 
situation in which the primary interest consisted of extracting the surplus of the 
periphery without any authentic trade relationship. A State enterprise was then 
created, which could be considered to be the embryo of the transnational corpo-
rations of the future. 
b) The second internationalization cycle had lasted approximately one century 
and coincided with the period during which the world experienced the so-called 
"Pax Britannica". A functional situation was established in which there was a 
financial circuit and an investment circuit which complemented each other, and raw 
materials were exchanged for manufactures. That system helped to develop primary 
production activities which interested-the countries of the centre and produced a 
certain transformation in Latin America. Logically, the growth process of Latin 
America during that era was oriented towards the outside. 
/During that 
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. . During that era, although all the conditions were present for a world, economy 
' baged. on the international division of work, benefits, were-not distributed 
equitably. In that cycle, which was the first important period of the international 
division of work, the system established was basically a dichotomy. The system 
functioned m that way until the First World War, there was then an interruption 
during the 1920s, which were, à time of very uncertain economic situation, and 
lasted until the Depression of the 1930s and the Second .World War. In that period, 
the internationalization process came to a standstill. 
c) The third cycle extended from the postwar era until, the beginning of the 
1970s. All of the countries participated in it, and it had exceptional dynamism, 
under the aegis, of the United States. The product of the countries of the centre 
rose, and the periphery, also became wore dynamic. Although the periphery doubled 
its per capita income from US$ 93 in 1950 to US$ 191 in 1975, the fruits of the . 
progress were concentrated. 
The transnational corporations were important during the first cycle and 
even more so during the second,. The periphery grew during the second cycle without 
any change in the distribution of profits between the centre and the periphery, 
which could be attributed to a .certain extent 'to thé activities of thè transnational 
corporations, since their investments were concentrated in the developed' countries, 
which explained the evolution ,of.their development and. the fact that they had been 
the receivers of the'technical progress. : ~ •'• ;•; •'-.' 
During the second cycle, the terms of trade prevailing during the previous 
cycle were maintained,. That had contributed to the despoilment of the periphery 
because it permitted the transfer of real income from Latin America to the ¿entres, 
since technical progress had not helped lower the price of the products of the 
central economies. , . , . . ' , 
A third element was worth mentioning in connection with that cycle, which 
related tq the concentration.and industrialization; of the world economy. The 
structure of the world economy had changed, and thé industrial products which were 
the subject of horizontal trade between industrialized countries began to have 
greater importance, while raw materials trade ,began to lose importance. 
During the third cycle, which was the expansive postwar cycle, the transfer 
of income had. been the catalyst of the growth /of the capitalist economy and the . 
element which had institutionalized the. capital formation process. During that 
cycle, there had been a.great change in the activities of the transnational 
corporations because investment had become internalized as a'result of thé transfer 
of the transnational corporations' manufacturing facilities to thé countries of 
the periphery so as to produce in order to meet the needs of the domestic market. 
In addition, not only production but also consumption patterns became 
in t er na t ional i zed. That cycle ended with the rise in .petroleum prices at the 
beginning of the 1970s. Following that rise, an abundance of .credit was produced 
which acted as a drug which dulled.reactions and caused.the current detot problem 
being experienced by Latin America.. It was.paradoxical that the abundance ,of 
liquidity had,been the result of the upheaval caused by the. rise 'in.oil prices. 
/As for 
As for the real transfer of resources, it had actually not been large but the 
abundance of credit had helped to turn attention away from problems and contributed 
to liberalizing foreign t*a$ie policies and import policies. There was no doubt 
that, during that stage, diifect investment by transnational, corporations had lost 
relative importance.''. 
With regard to the role which would fall to the transnational corporations 
in the future internationalization of the world economy, it should be borne in 
mind that if stagflation persisted in the.countries of the centre, the transfer 
of resources from them to thé periphery would decrease. The'transnational 
corporations would thus tend, to be;less important with regard to their capacity to 
generate a flow of resources, but it would continue to be vital to maintain a 
dialogue with the'ones develbping activities in the Latin American countries. 
The statement was followed by an extensive debate, which examined the ; 
possibilities for the Central American countries to begin to incorporate themselves 
into the activities currently being developed by the transnational corporations, 
and mention was made of the possibility that those activities might not be precisely 
industrial activities. He pointed out that:Central America1s basic objective was 
to ensure its capacity to supply itself in several spheres, one of which would be 
the area of food. Those industries would not be very dynamic¿ but the dynamism 
of industries maintained a relation to the distribution of income, and in his 
opinion, there were possibilities for expansion in that sphere. 
There was also the possibility that the first cycle of internationalization 
of the economy had left the legacy of a structure which could have been the cause 
of the defects currently being observed. Those corporations had created a pattern 
of industrialization towards the outside, but despite the fact that the resources, 
of Latin America had been exploited and surpluses extracted which were sent to 
the industrialized countries, a surplus had remained in the region which had made 
possible some diversification, and the fact that more internal changes had not 
been produced in the Latin American countries could be attributed to the lack of a 
national project. 
Another participant recalled that during the two cycles- of international-
ization of the economy, there had also been internalization processes, and that 
in the Second cycle the internalization process had helped create production assets 
oriented towards satisfying the needs of the internal market and linked to it and 
to its fate, which meant that the transnational corporation had established a 
relationship of dependence on that market. The activities of the transnational 
corporations had also had other repercussions, such as training activities. In 
addition, the proportion of the surplus generated which was retained was greater 
than it had been in the preceding periods, since in the former period only the 
wages remained, whereas in the current period, the technical progress also 




3.. Impact of.transnational corporations on 
... , Latin American development 
The discussion was l ed . 'Mr. Claudi?» Marinho, Acting Chief of" the Joint ECÈA-CTC' 
Unit on Transnational Corporations. He stated that Latin America»'like Central'' 
America, found itself in a situation of serious crisis not only of a structural 
type and attributable to.external reasons, but which coincided with a type of 
development which structurally would' have caused a crisis even if thè current 
world crisis had not occurred. '; '"' '\v';u : <r : 
It would be useful to provide, sòme back'èròund to, the'current'economic 
picture.,in .Latin America, but from a perspective of" crisis "rin the5 tódality of 
growth. ..W^in that picture, he 'would' situate thè activìtiéW of thè transnational 
corporations and provide "some thoughts on their role árid future pros£èbts. The 
analysis-would., be of ,a; global, nature, oriented towards. Mexico and the countries of 
southern. Latin,, Aj^ic^»,' wlfiqh were' the cmés who1 had made the'moát 'piogjfeáB; where 
possible, - V.. .1 ' ••'••-'••-•'•_ ; •"'. : • 
. order .to situate tha analysis,, he reviewed tha following aspects : the 
potential of the production apparatus, sane problems preventing the realization 
of that potential, the location .of ,,tt>e transnational corporations, and the " 
redefinition of dynamic-force:s.; -
With regard to analysis of the potential of the production apparatus, he 
pointed out that development, of the production forces had been achieved, and that 
the responsibility of the political .and economic léaders of the countries of Latin 
America was now established., A review of some figures indicated that thè situation 
of Latin America was comparable to that of Europe in 1950, when Europe was one of 
the most developed areas, in the world and contained some world powers« If some 
projections were made to Ì990 and Latin America were compared with'the European • 
Economic Community in 1970, it was observed that, for example, the gross domestic 
product would reach more than US$ 450 ,000 million, a figure'comparable to that of 
the ' European Economic Community in 1970. The manufacturing product' in thè region 
would reach US$ 135 000 million, a figure 20% lower than that attained by the EEC 
in 1970. The pupply of .electrical energy, machinery and equipment would also 
increase considerably. All that information showed that Latin America had the 
material base to affirm that the continent had greater material possibilities in 
1S82 than Europe in.1950, but on the other hand, several of thè region's problems 
had also worsened in recent.years and had placed it at an impasse, which required 
altering its course of development., 
Among those problems,, mention' should be made of the extreme poverty, the 
unequal distribution of income and the difference. ,bètweén*:thè growth of the 
population and employment... Forty ,per cent of the population' of Latin America, 
or 100 million persons,, lived in a state of absolute poverty. And among those 
110 million, 54 million were'in a state of indigence, òr had an annual income 
lower than US$ 100 at 1970 prices. 
/The distribution 
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The distribution of income had not undergone substantial alterations Îbetwéen 
1960 and 1970,. and continued to show a high concentration. Indeed, the poorest 
50% of the population earned 14% of the income,and the richest 30%, 72% of the 
income. In connection with the extreme poverty, it should he borne in mind that 
population forecast for 2000 was considerably greater, which would also undoubtedly 
create employment problems, especially taking account of the fact that according 
to the ILO, in 1970 30% of; the work force was underemployed. 
An examination of the situation of Latin America from the point of view of 
style of development and its repercussions on the external sector indicated that 
serious problems were also raised which were very difficult to solve within the 
framework of current modalities of growth. .. • . 
The industrialization of Latin America had been carried out within a scheme 
of import substitution and had developed from the simple, to the complex. A broad 
horizontal diversification of industry was thus produced, which satisfied a complex 
demand previously met by imports. However, equivalent vertical integration and 
intersectoral complementation had not been achieved. The modality of development 
was based on an imitative industrialization whose dynamic lay in the consumption 
of the higher strata of the income-distribution pyramid, and the production of 
those more complex goods made imports increasingly necessary. Thus the import 
coefficient had been growing since 1965, which had greatly increased the external 
vulnerability of the Latin American economies. The Latin American consumer society 
was incompatible with the eradication of those problems. Thought should be given 
to changing the patterns of development, redefining the current allocation of 
resources, and reorienting the dynamic forces, but in styles different from the 
current ones. 
Taking account of that context of structural crisis, he attempted to situate 
the transnational corporations. Those corporations, together with other elements, 
were a privileged actor in the consumer society. Transnational corporations were 
found in the most modern and most dynamic sectors of Latin America, and, therefore, 
participated in the exclusive, concentrating and vulnerable development of that 
continent. 
The activities of the transnational corporations had not helped to solve the 
problems, but had rather, contributed to aggravating them. 
It would also be useful to examine the relationship between the external 
sector and the transnational corporations. Naturally, foreign property in the 
most dynamic sectors of the Latin American economies tended to aggravate the 
imbalances.already examined. The imports being made by the transnational 
corporations did not appear to correspond to technical needs for imported contents 
of the goods they were producing; rather, those economic units appeared to be 
a type of "import vocation", and that naturally led to the formation Of a deficit, 
given their reluctance to export. In that connection it should be pointed out 
that the way in which the transnational corporations imported was quite peculiar, 
since they imported elements from enterprises which belonged to the same parent 
company, and that led to the well-known problem of transfer pricing, since 
operations were usually located in the best places for obtaining profits and those 
/prices were 
- 10 -
prices were fixed there on the basis of under- or over-invoicing; those transfers 
were often more important than the financial transfers. 
The elements indicated/in the: paragraphs above made it possible to state 
that the transnational, ¡ in some casesj [helped aggravate and intensify the crisis 
in the external sector. i ,v -
In order to make thé economy of Latin America more dynamic, possibilities 
could be explored of increasing exports, regional or subregional integration, or 
strengthening the domestic market. 
With regard to increasing exports, trade with centres could be examined and 
the opportunities f o r exporting commodities' and manufactures analysed. Growth 
of commodities exports was slow, and they continued to represent 75% for countries 
such as Brazil, Argentina and Mexico. Manufactures trade had risen from 8.7% 
to 23.6% between 1965 and 1977. It was possible that the protectionist measures 
applied to the exportation of light manufactured products, which were exported by 
the majority of Latin American countries, would intensify. The transnational 
colorations working in that sphere were showing.themselves to be reluctant to 
export, and when they did so, used their ovin channels; ; in other words> it was not 
to be hoped that the transnational corporations would help in that process. 
However, the formation of joint corporations among several countries, or the 
formation of State marketing companies offered interesting prospects, and in that 
connection, the example of INTERBRAS corporation, established for that purpose in 
Brazil, should be borne in mind. 
With Regard to integration, the share of interregional exports in the total 
exports of Latin America rose during the 1960s from 8 to 17%, while their share 
in world exports fell from 6,2 to 4.5%. The transnational corporations had had 
a fluctuating share in the production of the corporations for interregional export. 
They participated in some integration schemes in-order to ensure the market» but 
they traded among the firms making up the transnational conglomerates. Thus it was 
not feasible to hope that the transnational corporations would become important 
agents of the integration process, absolutely essential to the. future of the region. 
The domestic market had played an important dynamizing role in the past, 
and was continuing to do so, but that market was not a socially integrated one. 
The solution for the future would be to orient growth towards the satisfaction of 
generalized consumption neèds. If its domestic market, grew Latin America would 
necessarily decrease its vulnerability with respect to the world economy and would 
be inclined to new régional integration schemes. 
The statement was followèd by a discussion of the topic. Some participants 
stated that Central American integration would appèar to have been carried out with 
no order or harmony and with no examination of existing industry, and that 
perhaps that had influenced the problems currently being raised. 
/4. Transnational 
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4. Transnational corporations and Latin American export products; . 
the case of the Union of Banana Producing and 
Exporting Countries (UPEË1 
The discussion was led by Mr. Jan Knakal of EÇLA, who dealt mainly with four 
aspects: a) the balance of bargaining capacity and the distribution of benefits 
among banana-producing countries at the beginning of the 1980s; b) the changes in 
the strategies of the transnational corporations; c) the changes in the bargaining 
capacity of the producing countries and the lines of action; d) alternatives for 
strengthening the bargaining capacity of the UPEB countries. 
In connection with the first aspect, despite the changes which had occurred, 
at the beginning of the 1980s the integration of the oligopoly of the three United 
States banana-producing and exporting corporations has been maintained. On the 
other hand, national henefits, that is, retained value in the industry, had 
increased as a result of the policy applied by the Governments of the producing 
countries in negotiations, with the transnationals. 
The transnational corporations furthermore, had shown, great flexibility and 
ability to adapt to those policies and had reacted either by attempting to divide 
the member countries of UPEB or by diversifying their, activities, sources and 
markets, or by attempting to establish new systems to continue exerting influence, 
and had began to accept the principle that both benefits and costs should be . 
shared. They had also applied measures to restrict the access of the producing 
countries to consumer markets. 
UPEB was considered to represent an important experiment in relation to the 
establishment of the new international economic order. 
With regard to changes of strategy by the transnational corporations, among 
their causes was the desire of those corporations to decrease the dependency of 
their profits on a single product. The change of strategy had included the 
following measures : new production technologies; the establishment of a system of 
associated producers who, although they were land owners, were dependent on the 
transnationals for obtaining key production inputs; diversification of supply 
sources towards regions which offered fewer political risks; sectoral diversifi-
cation, aggressive marketing in their consumer markets and the establishment of 
barriers for other producers. In the face of the new policies of the Central 
American countries, the transnational corporations, after partially obtaining 
their objective of weakening the coipnon front, had accommodâted themselves to the 
new conditions established. 
He analysed the producing countriesf changes, in bargaining capacity from 
the perspective of the political and institutional sphere, diversification of the 
economy and position in the world market, and supply of the transnational 
corporations. From the point of view of the political sphere, he mentioned the 
increase in the share of the State and individuals in banana property, the 
broadening of knowledge of the development of the activity; improvement of policies 
concerning elaboration, formulation, promulgation and control, as well as policy 
governing negotiations with tie transnational corporations. He also mentioned 
/direct intervention 
direct intervention by the State at .all stages of banana-producing activity in 
order to decrease the persistent dependence of national production on the 
corporations. 
He also ..made mention of thè creation' of thè Union of Banana Exporting 
Countries, which constituted a multilateral base for. integrating th,e national .. 
interests and objéctives of the .different producing countries into one .position, 
and of COMUNBANA for international marketing. ; 
Similarly, the agricultural and economic diversification of Central America 
had helped to reduce the dependency with respect to the banana industry. 
With regard tp alternatives for action* there were several options at the 
national, regional and international levels for strengthening ; the bargaining . 
capacity of the UPEB countries. Among the possibilities; at the; national level 
were the improvement of thè administrative efficiency, of the?enterprises of- the 
public sector, the broadening and strengthening of the sectores links with the ,,. 
national producers, the systematization of control of the transnational corporations 
and the promotion of investment strategies ' for thè sèlf-sustainéd- development of 
the industry. In thè regional" sphere there wère, among: other actions¿ the 
establishment of a, flexible systèm of technical and economic information, which 
would facilitate control and negotiation with'thè transnational corporations; the 
broadening and diversification of supply sources and export markets; the promotion 
of multilateral negotiations for the exploration of new froms of participation in 
the industry and the strengthening of the mutual political and economic support 
base through the incorporation of other countries of the region into UPEB. In the 
international sphere, he suggested strengthening thè links with other producing 
countries of Asia and Africa and promoting the elaboration and adoption of an -
international agreement, for the creation of an international association of 
producing, countries. 
During the debate which followed the statement, it was expressed that joint 
action jay the Central American countries and Panama indicated the political will 
to carry forward a multilateral initiative such as UPEB. That ttoion enjoyed the 
autonomy coif erred upon it by. its security of financing., based on the relevant 
taxation, and could thus provide important support in its positions and furnish 
the producing countries with figures. COMUNBANA was created .subsequent to UPEB- . 
at the initiative fof Colombia, but its activities" were paralyzed because it- had to 
provide its own financing, and its activity at the international level had been' 
greatly restricted by the action of the transnational corporations. 
There was another,institution, COBANA, but that institution was dependent 
on the transnational corporations for inputs, rail transport, etc., and. was also 
obliged to pay a double charge, the fee collected-by the government of the 
producing country and that which it had to pay the transnational corporation. 
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5. The financial aspect in negotiations with 
transnational corporations 
The discussion was led by Mr. Michael Mortimore of the Joint ECLA-CTC Unit on 
Transnational Corporations. After referring to the principal approaches applied 
in the area of external financing, one of which corresponded to macroeconomic 
models for setting or determining the optimum level of indebtedness and the other 
to the capacity to sustain a particular public and external indebtedness policy, 
and to their main features and defects, he spoke in a more detailed manner of more 
global criteria. Those criteria were considerably different from the criteria 
mentioned previously and were based on elements of history and political economy. 
Applying an inductive method, and from the countries' point of view, a study was 
made of those countries suffering serious external indebtedness problems, which 
gave an indication of deficiencies and problems in the negotiating capacity between 
the State and the transnational banks arid made it possible to define some guide-
lines for improving strategy and negotiating position. 
A review of the crisis in Latin America turned on the causes of international 
liquidity problems. He pointed out that not all crises were:attributable to the 
same problems, since among those causing them mention could be made of the 
insufficiency of funds for debt repayment, either for conjunctural reasons or for 
reasons of creditworthiness. That was a structural difficulty in the short and 
medium term, the solution of which was not exclusively of a financial nature. In 
that case there was a maladjustment or a contradiction between the development 
strategy or its implementation and the international economic situation. 
He then mentioned conditions for improving negotiating capacity* The 
following elements should be taken into account: a) the awareness of the advantages 
held by the transnational banks depending on the seriousness of the financing 
problems of the countries, renegotiation being much more favourable to them than 
the contracting of the loan, so that the countries must make use of the advantages 
they have at the beginning of the negotiation; b) the way in which the interest 
rate was fixed favoured the transnational banks since the only thing open to 
negotiation was the spread over the basic rate, and that the latter had.gone up 
a great deal in recent years; each time, a smaller proportion of the total cost 
as regarded interest was being negotiated, and the countries were therefore obliged 
to negotiate longer terms. The negotiating position of the underdeveloped 
countries had worsened, and they therefore should seek external financing 
alternatives (multilateral and bilateral) to offset the shortfall. 
It was extremely important to the progress of the negotiations for the 
couritry to have an institutional system for appraising, recording, authorizing and 
controlling external financing and other forms of foreign participation. It was 
also important for the resources to be oriented towards the most profitable , 
investment projects in order to avoid debt-servicing problems. 
The country should always attempt to enter the capital market at the most 
appropriate time and try to negotiate with individual banks which had an interest 
in that relationship with a new client at a lower price. 
/In the 
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In the debatewhi.ch followed thestatement, it was pointed out that the 
indebtedness of Central America was chiefly of multilateral origin and that those 
multilateral credit institutions applied fluctuating rates with the consequent 
repercussions. There was also the problem of disbursement of thé- second financing 
quota of the financing granted by those institutions because the requirements 
with regard to the use of first payment had at times not been complied with. 
Replying to a question on the reasons why banks-were continuing to grant 
loans in spite of the countries® payment difficulties^ he said'that they did so 
because'they were pressured to place resources, and ftirthermûre, they applied 
risk-measuring systems on the basis of which they applied5 charges and fees to 
compensate their efforts. 
- -6. The trânsnatlonal corporations in the industrial 
M development of the developing countries ' 
The discussion was led by Mr. A.V. Ganesans of the Centre on Transnational 
Corporations, who con die ted a gener^ review "6f';the • following aspects: a) the 
trends and flows of the direct foreign investment carried out by transnational 
corporations in' developing countries; b) alternative forms of participation of 
transnational corpbrations not connected with stock capital; c) the motivation 
which led the transnational corporations to invest in the developing countries; 
and d)"participation by transnational corporations inexport promotion. 
With respect to the first topic, most direct foreign investment originated 
in transnational corporations with headquarters in the member countries of the 
Organization fô*1'Economic Co-operation aïid Development (OECD) and in the member 
countries of the European Economic Communities. 
He pointed out that the share of the developing countries in direct foreign 
investment flows had remained fairly stable during the 1960s and 1970s taken 
together, around 28%, and had gradually risen to around 33% at. the end of the 
decade. Some features of those• flows were worth mentioning, such asî à) they 
originated mainly in the developed countries, so: that the limitations of resources 
of thé transnational corporations in those countries influenced the flow of direct 
foreign investment towards the developing countries; b) they were decreasing in 
magnitude and their composition was changing, since the relative share of direct 
foreign investment aid official development assistance funds had been reduced, 
whereas that of the component representing loans from international banks and 
private export credits had increased. Direct foreign investment had increased by 
2 to 3% per year between 1970 and 1978, and for that reason, it could not be 
considered as the chief source of industrial financing in the developing, countries. 
Most of it did not constitute flows of new capital, since it was financed by the 
reinvestment of profits produced by previous investments by the- transnational 
corporations; for that reason, the policy being implemented of: reinvesting the 
profits of the transnational corporations was very important for attracting 
direct foreign investment. 
/With regard 
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With regard to participation in stock, he stated that from the 1970s on, 
the transnational corporations had begun to show an inclination for participation 
that did not involve net worth in stock, but other forms of property, such as 
licences and trademarks, management and technical assistance contracts, and 
participation in production and marketing. Their advantages and disadvantages 
depended on the circumstance and the sector in which the investment was being 
carried out. 
Speaking of the reasons for which the transnational corporations invested in 
the developing countries, he mentioned investment opportunities and the investirent 
climate. Among the reasons linked to investment opportunities were access to a 
local national market and to raw materials supplies, thé establishment of a 
regional, base in a country which gave access to the market of the, entire region ̂  
the utilization of that comtry as an export platform towards the markets of other 
developing com trie s and the protection of its technical knowledges. Among the 
reasons relating to the investment climate were the political, economic and 
monetary stability as a whole, the attitude of the country towards foreign invest-
ment, the bureaucratic and statutory frame of reference, the labour force and 
labour legislation, the availability of a basic infrastructure, and investment 
incentives. [ 
• •• • • . i . . 
As for participation by the transnational,corporations in the elaboration of 
export articles, it was important for developing countries with limited command 
of the market, for small countries which depended on export activity for the 
generation of employment and foreign currency. In connection with that activity, 
the transnational corporations preferred to.concentrâte on types of industries 
such as electronics, Clothing and sporting goods, which enabled them to take 
advantage of unskilled or semi-skilled, and therefore inexpensive labour, 
infrastructure, tax exemptions, non-existence of exchange controls, possibility of 
having the entire property, etc. For the récipient countries, thbse industries 
had thè advantage of generating employment for unskilled labour and foreign 
currency, but the disadvantage of paying low wages, not allowing unions, not 
establishing links of integration with the rest of the economy and not giving them 
the benefit of long-term investments. 
! 
Speaking of the reasons which motivated the transnational corporations to 
invest in the natural resources sector, he spoke of their wish to[ expand their 
access to those resources. Only 30% of the ore extracted in the developing 
countries was processed in the country itself, for several reason^, among which 
were:, the vertical and horizontal integration of the transnational corporations, 
the way in which the économies of the developing countries were structured, the 
fact that the capital equipment was manufactured in the developedjcountries and 
that those countries were the main consumers. 
In the discussion following the statement, mention was made| of the success 
which one country had had with its policy of establishing import and export 
obligations for the transnational corporations, as a result of which that country 
had a clear idea of its bargaining power based on the size of its| domestic market. 
One participant said that the question of how to take advantage of the installed 
capacity which remained when investors withdrew from a developing country should 
be studied. The speaker said that, in order to prevent unfavourable repercussions 
/in that 
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in that connection, the developing countries could insist -when highly capital-
intensive installations were built-on participating in thè control of investment . 
management during.the construction and installation, and later require that 
training be provided, exclusive technologies not be applied, and create -as. iii 
Japan- national marketing compan ié s 9 so that sal e s would not be paralyzed when the 
foreign company withdrew. 
7. Aspects of the negotiation process: project analysis 
Thé discussion of this topic arid the following was led by Mr. Charles J. Lipton,. 
Senior Consultant of the Centre on.Transnational Corporations. He explained his 
method of analysis, the discounted cash flow analysis, and then referred to its 
repercussions on the activities of the transnational corporations in the developing 
countries. The discount rate, applied by a transnational corporation would depend 
on many factors: it would have to exceed the return on a banking investment, taking 
account of the operating risks and, in the case of the developing countries, of 
other factors such as political and labour risks, etc. 
In order to negotiate a minimum rate of profitability with a transnational 
corporation, it was essential to be well aware of the elements with which the 
latter reasoned: the internal profitability rates estimated through the application 
of the discounted cash flow analysis : could be calculated on the basis of thè 
profitability òf the total investment (capital plus credit) or on the bas is òf.the 
profitability of the capitati alóne, which was the 'really important one. Hi otfder 
to' determine it, it was essential to know thé ratio between the amount of capital 
provided by the transnational corporation and thé amount of credit obtained, and 
therefore to havé exact information òn the financing of thè project. 
He pointed out that the dis oo un ted cash flow analys is should be conducted 
in current terms, and indicated that the "LIBOR" always reflectèd the discounted 
cash flow analysis in those terms.' The State should independently check the 
calculations of the internal profitability of capital and thé discounted cashflow 
analysis, using, if possible, methods comparable to the computer systems, uséd by 
the transnational corporations. The United Nations Centre on Transnational 
Corporations had computer programmes available for those purposes. 
As for.the term òf the contracts, according to the discounted cash flow 
analysis in current terns, it shòiil,d be no longer than 25 years. 
In order to verify thè profitability rate, it was necessary to be familiar 
with the corporation's bàìancé sheets, its projects in other countries, its profits 
in relation to its capital and its profitability rate in the past, all of which 
would serve as parameters in the negotiation. 
In the discussion following the statement, one participant referred to the 
disadvantageous situation iri which the governments of the developing countries 
found themselves in the negotiations, given their difficulties in access to 
information, and wished to know how that problem couid be overcome. 
/He said 
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He said that it was very important to obtain all the information, which 
could be provided by different sources, such as the Centre on Transnational 
Corporations, experts, consultants, the corporations' balance ¿heets, the stock 
market, etc. It was always possible to renegotiate an agreement that had been 
entered into under conditions which had not proved to be very advantageous to 
the developing country, but because of the cost of such a step, it was naturally 
preferable to avoid it if possible. 
Aspects Of the negotiating process: alternative forms 
of participation by transnational corporations in. 
projects in developing countries • • •>. 
He reviewed the types of agreements between the State and the transnational 
corporations in industrial activities in the developing oountries. 
He first discussed licensing, pointing out that in the Anglo-Saxon milieu, 
that type of agreement granted a property right and implied extraterritoriality.. 
Next he analysed leasing, which- included an annual sum and fixed-price royalties, 
with contracts of long duration. He then examined production-sharing agreements, 
which did not imply property and could retain the country's right to market its 
own portion; the most recent ones included a movable scale in relation to the value 
of the product and tax provisions which enabled the transnational corporations to 
deduct in their country of origin the taxes paid in the host country. In that 
connection, he stressed the importance of being familiar with all the tax conse-
quences of the provisions of the agreements in relation to the tax systems of 
the different foreign countries. He also mentioned the.service contract, through 
which the countries could obtain only the elements they really needed from the 
transnational corporations and not the complete package of capital, technology, 
business administration and marketing. There was also;the labour contract, and 
other forms of agreement such as exploration.rights and patents. Lastly, joint 
operations and their features were analysed. It was stressed that State property 
of a majority percentage of the registered capital was of political importance, 
and that it was only effectively valid to the extent that it was reflected in 
control of the operations, share in the profits and shared responsibility in the 
area of risks (which, in the case of the State, was not limited to the financial 
field). 
He referred to the financial risks for the State in the case of joint 
ventures and indicated that it was not desirable,for the State to guarantee the 
loans granted to the corporation and make itself responsible for the latter's . 
debts, and that all credit obtained through the State should be reflected in 
State share in the registered capital. He warned against the practice of "diluting" 
the proportional value of the State shares through the issuing of new shares. The 
State should receive shares freed,in proportion to the value of the resource it 
was contributing, as well as in proportion to the guarantees or loans being 
contributed in each case; the registered capital should be paid by the State 
against future dividends (and not in cash or bonds), and the dividend policy should 
envisage sufficient reserves. 
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Concerning the conclusion of joint ventures, it was advisable for the land 
not to be the cor potation's property, but rented by it; it should be stipulated 
that the real estate vroiild return to the State without payment, etc. ^ 
Emphasis was plced on the fact that the transnational corporations preferred 
the State to consider itself to be a participating empresario and not to take the 
role of sovereign State capable of setting the standards by which the joint/venture 
must abide. 
Joint ventresrc^oi^d ôr could nPt'be ¿»rporaticns. If they were, a new 
enterprise was established in which ;ttie capitalwasthe common property of the 
shareholders. If they were not, a new enterprise was not created and individuality 
continued for1 tax p;\irp5ëes. <:••': rf-r 
The joint venture offered the advantage of the enterprise's permitting invest-
ment to be controlled, either through a board of directors, technical committees, 
technology or through market-allocation or opportunities for competition or saleis 
control. The country could exèrcisë real control through specialized agencies or 
through reports to different governmental bodies. 
In the case of joint ventures¿the State could collect the remuneration due 
to it through royalties or taxes, whose amounts and dates of payment were fixed 
and regular. 
In the discussion following the statement^ interest was indicated in the 
form for determining what proportion of the capital was the corporation^ and 
what proportion was lent in those cases. He indicated that that was difficult 
to determine and that the transnational corporations always wanted the proportion 
of capital corresponding to loans to be as high as possihle, since that favoured 
them,'because interest payments were exempt from taxation, exchange control, and 
the flow of fmds -was facilitated. 
9. Legal aspects of negotiations 
He examined the problem of the legislation to be applied in the licensing 
agreements and indicated that the law of the host country should apply, that there 
should be no acceptance of clauses authorizing the freezing -at the date on which 
the contract was signed- of the legal provisions applied; neither should the 
transnational corporations be allowed to stipulate compensation in a case where 
the relevant law was changedV since that represented an invasion of sovereignty* 
He referred to forcé majeure„ arid warned against excessively broad clauses 
which could be used as an excusé by the transnational corporations for not 
fulfilling their contractual or applied obligations under circumstances which 
could have reasonably been foreseen. Similarly, examples of force ma je tire should 
not be listed in thé contract. -
As a protective measure, he suggested that the governments should include 
the option of putting an end to the contract if, for reasons of force majeure, 
an attempt was made to extend its validity beyond a reasonable period of time. 
/In connection 
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In connection With the renegotiation of the contracts, he pointed out that 
that occurred when an imbalance in contractual obligations had been produced, but 
that there were differing opinions as to the advisability of including a renego-
tiation clause in the original contract or not, since although some people believed 
that facilitated the task of renegotiating later on, others believed that it was 
difficult to find an effective clause and that, in addition, it should be borne 
in mind that even if the renegotiation were not stipulated, the State was sovereign 
and could renegotiate when it pleased, 
With regard to arbitration, he believed that the host countries should 
insist that national legislation prevail in those casés for reasons of sovereignty 
and its courts' reputation for integrity. 
In cases where that principle was not accepted, one could have recourse to 
thé intèrnational Chamber of Commerce at Paris, but that was a lengthy and 
burdensome procedure. One could also turn to the International Centre for the 
Settlement of Investment Differences (CIADI) or the United Nations Commission for 
International Trade Law (CNUDMI) which had recently taken some important steps 
in tiiiat area. 
As for the place where the' arbitration should be carried out, he stressed 
that it would havë to be the developing country which had signed the agreement; 
if the other party demanded that the arbitration' should take place in another 
country, the developing country had to insist that it should be the closest 
country to the headquarters country and that the travel costs of its represen-
tatives should be paid. 
In the discussion following the statement, it was pointed out that sudden 
market fluctuations did not constitute cases of force majeure but normal * 
commercial risks. Several participants wished to know if the-non-inclusion of 
renegotiation clauses could hinder future negotiations. He stressed the fact 
that it was not necessary to include them, since the States, were sovereign and 
could renegotiate whenever they felt it to be advisable. 
With regard to the language in which the contract was to be drafted, he 
stressed that the original version should be in the language of the host country, 
and that that aspect was not negotiable. Whoever prepared the first draft had 
many advantages, and could request legal advisory assistance, from the Centre on 
Transnational Corporations in carrying out that task. 
10. Acquisition of technology 
The discussion was led by Mr. A.V. Ganesan* who first mentioned the individual 
or collective advisory assistance lent by the Centre on Transnational 
Corporations in connection with negotiations. Those services had the following 
features: they were free, easily accessible and satisfied the countries' specific 
needs. The Centre lent assistance to countries in the stage prior to the 
initiation of negotiations, during the negotiations and after the signing of the 
agreement in order to improve it subsequently. 
/With regard 
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.•:..,:'.; With regard to the acquisition of technology, he pointed out that the. 
element which distinguished developing countries from developed countries was not 
so much the lack of resources or capital or the different degree of skill of the 
labour, but the degree. <?f technological development. 
The control exercised by the transnational corporations was based on their 
¡ • technological superiority,;-in .other wards, on their possession of technical 
knowledge and registered trademarks. The transnational corporations were aware of 
the capacity of the developing countries in the area of technology, and that 
determined-their behaviour in the, negotiations. The developing countries sought 
foreign-investment because it brought with it the ready-made incorporation of 
advanced technology rather than because of the investment of capital. 
The developing countries.,should give top priority to the formulation, of a 
national research and technology policy. ,The. policy should define the country's 
technological needs in relation to its economic policy and development needs and 
the sectors and specializations whose improvement should be stimulated. : 
The elements which should be kept in mind for the acquisition of technology 
were the selection of the fields most suitable to the country and the existence 
of mechanisms for absorption which were not unduly expensive. Since the 
acquisition of technology was equivalent to the acquisition of knowledge, a basic 
preparation was usually necessary in-order to assimilate«the new technology and 
become familiar with the market in which, it .was acquired« Similarly, a national 
data base should be formed in order to be in a position to issue opinion? on the 
acquisition of technology and compile information on international market trends, 
and on the main suppliers in each field. 
It was also necessary to have information on the types of agreements which 
could be used in negotiations for acquisition, of technology and safeguard systems. 
The following basic forms of agreements coul,4>be distinguished:, licensing agreements 
and technical, services agreements. The first -included agreements .for licensing 
of patents for registered trademarks and technical, knowledge... , The second involved 
contracts for the delivery of already-assembled factories, with services and 
technical assistance:, administration and marketing. The difference between the 
two was that a single price, was, applied to the former, and. it was" difficult to 
clarify whether it was a high ,one or not, while with the latter, specific 
service was acquired, and it was. easier to .determine ,if its price was a fair one. 
Licensing agreements had a special, feature in that the licensee maintained 
ownership of the knowledge and authorized the use of trademarks arid "technical 
knowledge. . c 
With regard to payment of the technology, it could take the form of a 
percentage of• investment profits, technical fees or permanent royalties. A few 
guidelines should be considered for th^t..purpose: a).in. accordance with the 
proportion of the capital belonging to. the foreign parent company; if the latter 
owned half of the capital, royalties-.were not. warranted since, the payment should 
be made through a share in the profits.. ,it should be borne in mind that , according 
to the provisions of the Cartagena Agreement, subsidiaries could not pay. royalties 
to parent countries for transfer of technology; b) higher limits should be 
/established for 
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established for payments for technology;in proportions representing not more than 
50% of sales or 25% of capital; royalties should not be less than 5%. With regard 
to technical fees, which were made, in a single payment, the sum considered 
reasonable should represent a percentage of the total value of the sales. "..' 
As for setting the amount of fees corresponding to the management contracts, 
the developing countries should insist, during the negotiation, that a basic 
minimum fee and a percentage of the profits should be set. 
With regard to trademarks, he stated that the payment of royalties as 
registered trademarks to be used in the internal market should not be authorized. 
Payment of higher royalties as registered trademarks should only be authorized 
if the enterprise exported the product in question. 
With regard to the relationship between the period of payment and the period 
of validity of the agreement, the majority of the developing countries limited it 
to a period between 5 and 10 years because in that way, the period of dependency 
on external supply was limited. A review could be made after a certain time in 
order to compare the results with the expectations. If it was found to be suitable, 
measures could be determined for the local enterprises to adopt in order to ensure 
absorption of technology in a sensible period of time when the process was 
considered to be advancing rather slowly. 
The list of restrictive trade practices included clauses guaranteeing 
exclusive rights of the parent companies, such as for example, those establishing 
the subsidiaries' obligation to acquire components, spare parts, etc., from them. 
In order to protect themselves from that requirement, the enterprises could 
separate local activity from external purchases and at least require that prices 
should be established according to the standard of independence. With regard to 
the limitation concerning the countries to which exportation was authorized, that 
could be offset by restricting it to countries where the licenser had signed prior 
agreements and to those which, because of their distance, it was not suitable to 
export. They could also participate in setting the resale price of the product. 
Other clauses which should be included in the agreements covered training, 
which was one of the best ways of ensuring that the transfer of technology would 
be carried out effectively and, further, that it would be absorbed by the 
enterprise. The fields covered by training should be defined very clearly. 
On the subject of the areas which should be encompassed by the science and 
technology policy, those could be national, subregional or regional. National 
co-ordination facilitated negotiations since it covered a broader area and better 
conditions could be obtained. 
In the debate which followed the statement, concern was expressed in 
connection with the assistance which the Centre on Transnational Corporations 
could lend to the Central American countries which did not have a policy on that 
subject but applied isolated measures and might not have the personnel prepared 
to give authorization when contracts were signed. He replied that the Centre 
could give assistance in examining the report in order to check the quality of 
the technology offered, the competence of the suppliers, the fair value of the 
technology and the application of restrictive trade practices. 
/In connection 
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In connection with payments as transfer, he ; said the .countries should apply 
broad guidelines and require legislative backing. The Central American region 
should purchase technology in the market and adapt it to its needs., It.wpuld also 
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